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Abstract
Mechanization¡ the replacement by machines of humans engaged in production tasks¡
is a continuing process since the Industrial Revolution. As a result, humans have shifted
to tasks machines cannot perform eﬃciently. The general trend until about the 1960s is
the shift from manual tasks to analytical (cognitive) tasks, while, since the 1970s, because
of the advancement of IT technologies, humans have shifted away from routine analytical
tasks (such as simple information processing tasks) as well as routine manual tasks toward
non-routine analytical tasks and non-routine manual tasks in services. Mechanization also
has aﬀected relative demands for workers of diﬀerent skill levels and thus earnings levels
and earnings inequality. The rising inequality has been the norm in economies with lightly
regulated labor markets, although the inequality fell in periods when the relative supply
of skilled workers grew rapidly.
This paper develops a Ricardian model of task assignment and examines how improve-
ments of productivities of machines and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers
aﬀect task assignment (which factors perform which tasks), earnings, earnings inequality,
and aggregate output in order to understand these trends.
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1 Introduction
Mechanization¡ the replacement by machines of humans (and animals) engaged in produc-
tion tasks¡ is a continuing process since the Industrial Revolution. During the Industrial
Revolution between the second half of the 18th century and the ﬁrst half of the 19th century,
mechanization progressed in tasks intensive in manual labor: in manufacturing, particularly
in textile and metal working, machines and factory workers replaced artisans and farmers
engaged in side jobs; in transportation, railroads and steamboats supplanted wagons and
sailboats; and in agriculture, threshing machines and reapers reduced labor input greatly.1
During the Second Industrial Revolution between the second half of the 19th century and
World War I, with the utilization of electric power and internal combustion engines, mech-
anization proceeded further in manual tasks: in manufacturing, broader industries and pro-
duction processes were mechanized with the introduction of mass production system; wider
tasks were mechanized with tractors in agriculture and with automobiles and trucks in trans-
portation. Further, some analytical (cognitive) tasks too were mechanized during the era:
tabulating machines substituted workers engaged in data processing tasks and teleprinters
replaced Morse code operators. In the post World War II era, especially since the 1970s,
analytical tasks in much wider areas have been mechanized because of the rapid growth of IT
technologies: computers replaced clerical workers engaged in information processing tasks;
sensors mechanized inspection processes in manufacturing and services (particularly in com-
merce and distribution); and simple troubleshooting tasks in many sectors were mechanized
with the construction of databases of known troubles.2
Consequently, humans have shifted to tasks machines cannot perform eﬃciently. The
general trend until about the 1960s is the shift from manual tasks to analytical tasks: ini-
tially, they shifted from manual tasks at farms and cottages to manual tasks at factories
and analytical tasks at oﬃces and factories mainly associated with clerical, management,
and technical jobs; after mechanization deepened in manufacturing, they shifted away from
manual tasks at factories as well as at farms to the analytical tasks. Since the 1970s, as a
result of the advancement of IT technologies, humans have shifted away from routine ana-
lytical tasks (such as simple information processing tasks) as well as manual tasks toward
non-routine analytical tasks mainly associated with professional and technical jobs and non-
routine manual tasks in services such as personal care, protective service, and cleaning.3;4
Further, as can be inferred from the shifts in tasks, mechanization has aﬀected relative
demands for workers of diﬀerent skill levels and thus earnings levels and earnings inequality.
In the early stage of industrialization, earnings of unskilled workers grew very moderately
1Works on the Industrial Revolution and the Second Industrial Revolution by economic historians include
Landes (2003) and Mokyr (1985, 1999).
2Case studies of eﬀects of IT technologies on the workplace include Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2002) on
a commercial bank and Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) on a bulb manufacturing factory.
3Similarly to Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), routine tasks refer to tasks whose procedures are orga-
nized so that they can be performed by machines after relevant technologies are developed.
4Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) examine changes in the composition of tasks performed by humans
in the U.S. economy between 1960 and 1998 and ﬁnd that the advancement of IT technologies is impor-
tant in explaining the changes after the 1970s. Relatedly, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) explore changes in
occupational composition for the longer period, 1959¡2007.
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and earnings inequality between skilled and unskilled workers increased.5 In later periods,
unskilled workers have beneﬁted more from mechanization, while, as before, the rising in-
equality has been the norm in economies with lightly regulated labor markets, except in
periods of rapid growth of the relative supply of skilled workers and in the 1940s, when
the inequality fell.6 Since the 1990s, owing to the large shift away from routine analytical
tasks, wage growth of middle-wage jobs has been weak relative to both high-wage and low-
wage jobs and thus wage polarization (and job polarization) has been observed in economies
including the U.S.7;8
This paper develops a Ricardian model of task assignment and examines how improve-
ments of productivities of machines and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers
aﬀect task assignment (which factors perform which tasks), earnings, earnings inequality,
and aggregate output in order to understand the aforementioned long-run trends.
The model economy is a static small-open competitive economy where three kinds of
factors of production¡ skilled workers, unskilled workers, and machines¡ are available.
Each factor is characterized by analytical ability and manual ability. Skilled workers have a
higher level of analytical ability than unskilled workers, while both types of workers have the
same level of manual ability, reﬂecting the fact that there is no strong correlation between
the two abilities, except in poorest countries.
The ﬁnal good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that are diﬀerent in the
importance of analytical ability and the ease of codiﬁcation (routinization) using a Leontief
technology.9 The three factors are perfectly substitutable at each task, and a unit of each
factor supplies a unit of time inelastically. Both types of abilities contribute to production
at each task (except the most manual tasks and the most analytical tasks), but the rel-
ative contribution of analytical ability is higher in tasks of the greater importance of the
ability. For given the ability’s importance, machines are more productive in tasks with the
5Feinstein (1998) ﬁnds that real wages and the standard of living of British manual workers improved
very moderately between the 1770s and the 1850s (they more or less stagnated until the 1830s). The
ﬁnding suggests that earnings inequality between them and skilled workers such as white-collar employees,
merchants, and professionals rose greatly during the period.
6Goldin and Katz (1998), based on data from 1909 to 1940, show econometrically that the introduction
of particular mass production methods, continuous process and batch methods, raised the relative demand
for skilled workers in U.S. manufacturing. Goldin and Katz (1999) document that returns to high school
education in the U.S. fell considerably sometime between 1914 and 1939, when high school enrollment rates
rose dramatically (from about 20% to over 70%), while thereafter the returns continued to rise except in the
1940s when they fell sharply. As for returns to college education in the U.S., after plummeting in the 1940s,
they kept rising except in the 1970s when the relative supply of college educated workers grew rapidly due
to the entry of baby boom cohorts into the labor market.
7Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) ﬁnd the evidence of wage polarization for the U.S. economy between
1988 and 2004. OECD (2008) documents that, after the 1990s, wage inequality between middle-wage and
high-wage workers enlarged in most developed economies studied, while the disparity between middle-wage
and low-wage workers shrunk or was stable in the majority of the economies.
8Job polarization is the phenomenon where job growth is strong at high-wage and low-wage jobs and is
weak at middle-wage jobs. It is identiﬁed ﬁrst for the U.K. economy by Goos and Manning (2003). Later
studies such as Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010) ﬁnd that it is
observed in most developed economies.
9The term codify/routinize means ”organize procedures of tasks systematically so that tasks can be
performed by machines after relevant technologies are developed” in this paper.
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greater ease of codiﬁcation, while, for simplicity, workers’ productivities are assumed to be
independent of the ease of codiﬁcation.
A competitive equilibrium determines task assignment, factor prices, task prices, and out-
put etc. Comparative advantages of factors determine task assignment: unskilled (skilled)
workers are assigned to relatively manual (analytical) tasks and machines are assigned to
tasks that are easier to codify. Among tasks a given factor is employed, it is employed
heavily in tasks in which its productivities are low.
Based on the model, the paper examines how task assignment, earnings, earnings in-
equality (relative earnings of skilled workers to unskilled workers), and output change over
time, when analytical and manual abilities of machines improve exogenously over time. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes a simpler case in which the two abilities grow proportionately and machines
have comparative advantages in relatively manual tasks. The analysis shows that tasks and
workers strongly aﬀected by mechanization change over time. Mechanization starts from
tasks that are highly manual and easy to routinize and gradually spreads to tasks that
are more analytical and more diﬃcult to routinize. Eventually, mechanization proceeds in
highly analytical tasks, those previously performed by skilled workers, as well. Accordingly,
workers shift to tasks that are more diﬃcult to codify and, except at the ﬁnal stage, more
analytical. Skilled workers always beneﬁt from mechanization, whereas the eﬀect on earnings
of unskilled workers is ambiguous while mechanization mainly aﬀects them and the eﬀect
turns positive afterwards. Earnings inequality rises except at the ﬁnal stage, where it does
not change. And the output of the ﬁnal good always increases. By contrast, an increase in
the relative supply of skilled workers raises (lowers) earnings of unskilled (skilled) workers
and thus lowers the inequality (it also raises output).
The results are consistent with long-run trends of task shifts, earnings, and earnings
inequality described earlier, except job polariztion after the 1990s and the development
of the latter two variables after around 1980 and in the wartime 1940s. However, the
assumption that the two abilities grow proportionately, which made the analysis simple, is
rather restrictive, considering that the growth of manual ability was faster in most periods of
time, while analytical ability seems to have grown faster than manual ability recently. Hence,
Section 5 analyzes the general case in which the two abilities may grow at diﬀerent rates.
Under realistic productivity growth, the model can explain long-run trends of the variables,
except the development in the 1940s and the recent job and wage polarization, which is
beyond the scope of the model with two types of workers, although the falling inequality
predicted by the model may capture a part of the development, the falling inequality between
low-skill and middle-skill workers. Finally, the model is used to examine possible future
trends of the variables when the rapid growth of IT technologies continues.
The paper belongs to the literature on task (job) assignment model, which has been
developed to analyze the distribution of earnings in labor economics (see Sattinger, 1993,
for a review), and recently is used to examine broad issues, such as eﬀects of technology
on the labor market (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), on cross-country productivity diﬀerences
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001), and on organizational structure and wages (Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), eﬀects of international trade and oﬀshoring on the labor market
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, and Costinot and Vogel, 2010), and inter-industry
wage diﬀerentials and the eﬀect of trade on wages (Sampson, 2011).
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The most closely related is Acemoglu and Autor (2011), who argue that the conventional
model fails to explain a large part of trends of task shifts, earnings, and earnings inequality
after the 1980s, particularly job and wage polarization after the 1990s,10 and develop a task
assignment model with three types of workers (high skill, middle skill, low skill), which is a
generalization of the Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) model with two types of workers. The
ﬁnal good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that are diﬀerent in the degree of
’complexity’ using a Cobb-Douglas technology. High (middle) skill workers have comparative
advantages in more complex tasks against middle (low) skilled workers. After examining
task assignment, earnings, and relative earnings in an economy without capital, they analyze
the situation where a part of tasks initially performed by middle skill workers come to be
mechanized exogenously and ﬁnd that a fraction of these workers shift to tasks previously
performed by the other types of workers and relative earnings of high skill workers to middle
skill workers rise and those of middle skill workers to low skill workers fall, reproducing job
and wage polarization.11
The present paper builds on their work, particularly in the modeling, but there are
several important diﬀerences. First, the paper is interested in long-run trends of task shifts,
earnings, and earnings inequality since the Industrial Revolution, while they focus on the
development after the 1980s, especially job and wage polarization after the 1990s. Second,
the paper examines how tasks and workers strongly aﬀected by mechanization change over
time with improvements of machine abilities, whereas, because of their focus on job and
wage polarization, they assume that mechanization occurs at tasks previously performed by
middle skill workers. Third, in order to examine the dynamics of mechanization, the present
model supposes that tasks are diﬀerent in two dimensions, the importance of analytical
ability and the ease of codiﬁcation (routinization); while, in their model, tasks are diﬀerent
in one dimension, the degree of ’complexity’.
The paper is also related to the literature that theoretically examines the interaction
between mechanization and economic growth, such as Givon (2006), Zeira (1998, 2006),
and Peretto and Seater (2008). The literature is mainly interested in whether persistent
growth is possible in models where economies grow through mechanization and whether the
dynamics are consistent with stylized facts on growth. While the standard model assumes
labor-augmenting technical change, which is labor-saving but not capital-using (and thus
does not capture mechanization), Givon (2006) and Peretto and Seater (2008) consider
technical change that is labor-saving and capital-using. By contrast, given technologies,
Zeira (2006) examines interactions among capital accumulation, changes in factor prices, and
10Limitations of the conventional model, in which workers with diﬀerent skill levels are imperfect sub-
stitutes in a macro production function, pointed out by Acemoglu and Autor include: the model cannot
explain stagnant or negative earnings growth of particular groups in a growing economy; typically, workers
are two type and thus it cannot examine phenomena such as ’wage polarization’; systematic changes in job
(task) composition such as ’job polarization’ cannot be analyzed; since all workers with a given skill level
have the same ’job’, shifts in jobs and tasks performed by particular groups cannot be examined; technical
change is factor-augmenting, thus it does not model mechanization through technical change, which is also
pointed out in the literature on growth models with mechanization reviewed below.
11They also examine the situation where a part of tasks initially performed by middle skill workers come to
be oﬀshored exogenously. Further, they analyze the eﬀect of changes in factor supplies on technical change
using a version of the model with endogenous factor-augmenting technical change.
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mechanization. The Zeira (2006)’s model can be interpreted as a dynamic task assignment
model after a slight modiﬁcation of the production technology. However, the model assumes
homogenous labor and constant productivity of machines and thus cannot examine the issue
this paper focuses on.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 derives
equilibrium allocations, given machine abilities. Section 4 examines eﬀects of improvement
of machine abilities on task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output,
when the two abilities improve proportionately. Section 5 examines the general case in which
the abilities may improve at diﬀerent rates, and Section 6 concludes. Appendix contains
proofs of lemmas and propositions, except Propositions 4¡7 whose proofs are very lengthy
and thus are posted on the author’s web site.12
2 Model
Consider a small open economy where three kinds of factors of production¡ skilled workers,
unskilled workers, and machines¡ are available. All markets are perfectly competitive.
Abilities and productivities of factors : Each factor is characterized by analytical ability
and manual ability. Denote analytical abilities of a skilled worker, an unskilled worker, and
a machine by h; la, and ka, respectively, where h > la, and their manual abilities by lm, lm,
and km; respectively. Two types of workers have the same level of manual ability, reﬂecting
the fact that there is no strong correlation between the two abilities, except in poorest
countries. The ﬁnal good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that are diﬀerent
in the importance of analytical ability, a 2 [0; 1], and the ease of codiﬁcation (routinization),
c 2 [0; 1]. Tasks are uniformly distributed over the (a; c) space and productivities of skilled
workers, unskilled worker, and machines in task (a; c) are given by:
Ah(a) = ah+ (1¡ a)lm; (1)
Al(a) = ala + (1¡ a)lm; (2)
cAk(a) = c[aka + (1¡ a)km]: (3)
Except the most manual tasks (a = 0) and the most analytical tasks (a = 1), both abilities
contribute to production in each task, but the relative contribution of analytical ability is
greater in tasks with higher a.13 For given a, machines are more productive in tasks with
higher c, while workers are assumed to be equally productive for any c. Since h > la, skilled
workers have comparative advantages in more analytical tasks relative to unskilled workers.
Production: At each task, the three factors are perfectly substitutable and thus the
production function of task (a; c) is expressed as:
y(a; c) = Ah(a)nh(a; c) + Al(a)nl(a; c) + cAk(a)nk(a; c); (4)
12The address is http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/˜yuki/english.html.
13One interpretation of the speciﬁcation is that a task with certain a is composed of the proportion a of
analytical subtasks, where only analytical ability is useful, and the proportion 1¡a of manual ones, and the
two types of subtasks requiring diﬀerent abilities are perfectly substitutable in the production of the task.
(Due to indivisibility of subtasks and economies of scope, one needs to perform both types of subtasks.)
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where ni(a; c) (i = h; l; k) is the measure of factor i engaged in the task. The output of the
task, y(a; c), may be interpreted as either an intermediate good or a direct input in ﬁnal
good production, which is produced by either ﬁnal good producers or separate entities.
The ﬁnal good production function is Leontief with equal weights on all tasks, that is,
all tasks are equally essential in the production:
Y = min
a;c
fy(a; c)g: (5)
The Leontief speciﬁcation is assumed for simplicity. Similar results would be obtained as long
as diﬀerent tasks are complementary in the production, although more general speciﬁcations
seem to be analytically intractable.14
Factor markets : A unit of each factor supplies a unit of time inelastically. Let the ﬁnal
good be a numeraire and let the relative price of (the output of) task (a; c) be p(a; c). Then,
from proﬁt maximization problems of intermediate producers,
p(a; c)Ah(a) = (·)wh for any (a; c) with nh(a; c) > (=)0, (6)
p(a0; c0)Al(a0) = (·)wl for any (a0; c0) with nl(a0; c0) > (=)0, (7)
p(a00; c00)c00Ak(a00) = (·)r for any (a00; c00) with nk(a00; c00) > (=)0, (8)
where wh (wl) is earnings of a skilled (unskilled) worker, and r is exogenous interest rate.
From these equations, the basic pattern of task assignment can be derived (details are
explained later). Because Ah(a)
Al(a)
· (¸)wh
wl
for any (a; c) satisfying nh(a; c) = (>)0 and
nl(a; c) > (=)0 and
Ah(a)
Al(a)
increases with a, there exists unique a¤ 2 (0; 1) satisfying Ah(a¤)
Al(a¤)
=
wh
wl
and unskilled (skilled) workers are chosen over skilled (unskilled) workers for a < (>)a¤.
That is, unskilled (skilled) workers are assigned to relatively manual (analytical) tasks, and,
as wh
wl
increases, the range of tasks (in terms of a) performed by unskilled (skilled) workers
expands (shrinks). Of course, which factor is employed in a given task depends on the relative
proﬁtability of workers to machines as well. For a < a¤, unskilled workers (machines) are
assigned to tasks (a; c) with Al(a)
cAk(a)
> (<)wl
r
, and for a > a¤, skilled workers (machines) are
assigned to tasks (a; c) with Ah(a)
cAk(a)
> (<)wh
r
. Comparative advantages of factors and relative
factor prices determine task assignment.
Task (intermediate) markets : Because each task (intermediate good) is equally essential
in ﬁnal good production, y(a; c) = Y must hold for any (a; c). Thus, the following is
true for any (a; c) with nh(a; c) > 0, any (a
0; c0) with nl(a0; c0) > 0, and any (a00; c00) with
nk(a
00; c00) > 0, except for the set of measure 0 tasks in which multiple factors are employed:
Ah(a)nh(a; c) = Al(a
0)nl(a0; c0) = c00Ak(a00)nk(a00; c00) = Y: (9)
Given the task assignment, factors are employed heavily in low productivity tasks.
Denote the measure of total supply of factor i (i = h; l; k) by Ni (Nk is endogenous).
Then, by substituting (9) into
RR
ni(a;c)>0
ni(a; c)dadc = Ni,
14The model with a Cobb-Douglas production function seems to be quite diﬃcult to analyze. An advan-
tage of the Leontief speciﬁcation over the Cobb-Douglas one is that, as shown below, the former yields a
realistic result that, among tasks a certain factor is employed, it is employed heavily in tasks in which their
productivities are low.
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NhRR
nh(a;c)>0
1
Ah(a)
dadc
=
NlRR
nl(a;c)>0
1
Al(a)
dadc
=
NkRR
nk(a;c)>0
1
cAk(a)
dadc
= Y: (10)
The ﬁrst equality of the equation is one of the two key equations, which states that task
assignment must be determined so that demands for two types of workers satisfy the equality.
Since the ﬁnal good is a numeraire and a unit of the ﬁnal good is produced from inputs
of a unit of every task,ZZ
p(a; c)dadc = 1 (11)
, wl
ZZ
nl(a;c)>0
1
Al(a)
dadc+ wh
ZZ
nh(a;c)>0
1
Ah(a)
dadc+ r
ZZ
nk(a;c)>0
1
cAk(a)
dadc = 1; (12)
where the second equation is derived using (6)¡(8) with the equal sign. (12) is the second key
equation, which states that task assignment must be determined so that the unit production
cost of the ﬁnal good equals 1.
Equilibrium: An equilibrium is deﬁned by (6)¡(8), (9), (10), (12), and the task assign-
ment conditions (Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
= wh
wl
, Al(a)
cAk(a)
= wl
r
, and Ah(a)
cAk(a)
= wh
r
). By using the task assignment
conditions, the ﬁrst equality of (10) and (12) are expressed as simultaneous equations of
wh and wl. Once the factor prices and thus task assignment are determined, Nk and Y
(= y(a; c)) are determined from the second and third equalities of (10), respectively; ni(a; c)
(i = h; l; k) is determined from (9); and p(a; c) is determined from (6) ¡ (8).
3 Analysis
This section derives task assignment and earnings explicitly, given machine abilities ka and
km. So far, no assumptions are imposed on comparative advantages of machines. Until
Section 5, it is assumed that ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
), that is, machines have comparative advantages
in relatively manual tasks. Then, Al(a)
Ak(a)
and Ah(a)
Ak(a)
increase with a. With this assumption,
the task assignment conditions can be stated more explicitly.
3.1 Task assignment conditions
Remember that, for a < a¤, unskilled workers (machines) perform tasks (a; c) with Al(a)
cAk(a)
>
(<)wl
r
, and for a > a¤, skilled workers (machines) perform tasks (a; c) with Ah(a)
cAk(a)
> (<)wh
r
,
where a¤ is deﬁned by Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
= wh
wl
. Further, since ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
); humans (machines)
perform tasks with relatively high (low) a and low (high) c, and, for given c, machines
perform tasks with a > a¤ only if they perform all tasks with a · a¤. Based on this
basic pattern of assignment, critical variables and functions determining task assignment,
cm; c
¤; ca; cl(a); and ch(a), are deﬁned next.
Unskilled workers vs. machines : From the above discussion, whenever nk(a; c) > 0 for
some (a; c), nk(0; 1) > 0, i.e. whenever machines are used in production, they perform the
most manual and easiest-to-codify task. Deﬁne cm as
Al(0)
cmAk(0)
= lm
cmkm
= wl
r
; that is, cm is the
value of c such that hiring a machine and hiring an unskilled worker are equally proﬁtable
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Figure 1: An example of task assignment when ka
km
< la
lm
and cm < c
¤ < ca < 1
at task (0; cm). (Under the assumption
ka
km
< la
lm
, cm is the lowest c satisfying nk(a; c) > 0.)
Then, other (a; c)s satisfying Al(a)
cAk(a)
= wl
r
is given by Al(a)
cAk(a)
= lm
cmkm
. Let cl(a) ´ kmlm
Al(a)
Ak(a)
cm.
For given a, a machine and an unskilled worker are equally proﬁtable at c = cl(a) and the
former (latter) is chosen over the latter (former) for c > (<)cl(a). If there exists c < 1 such
that they are equally proﬁtable at a = a¤, i.e. cl(a¤) = kmlm
Al(a
¤)
Ak(a¤)
cm < 1, machines perform
some tasks with a > a¤. If km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ak(a¤)
cm ¸ 1; machines do not perform any tasks with a > a¤:
Let c¤ ´ min
n
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ak(a¤)
cm;1
o
:
Skilled workers vs. machines : When c¤ < 1, skilled workers and machines must be
compared. Since Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
= wh
wl
, (a; c)s satisfying Ah(a)
cAk(a)
= wh
r
is given by Ah(a)
cAk(a)
= lm
km
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
1
cm
and let ch(a) ´ kmlm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
Ah(a)
Ak(a)
cm. For given a, hiring a skilled worker and hiring a machine
are equally rewarding at c = ch(a). If there exists c < 1 such that both are equally proﬁtable
at a = 1, i.e. ch(1) =
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm < 1, machines perform some tasks with a = 1. Let
ca ´ min
n
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm;1
o
:
Figure 1 illustrates cm; c
¤; ca; cl(a); and ch(a) and thus task assignment on the (a; c) space,
assuming that cm < c
¤ < ca < 1 holds. For given a, machines perform tasks with higher
c. From the assumption that machines have comparative advantages at relatively manual
tasks, for given c; they perform tasks with lower a and the proportion of tasks performed
by machines decreases with a, i.e. cl(a) and ch(a) are upward sloping. (These properties are
satisﬁed when cm < c
¤ < ca < 1 do not hold too.)
3.2 Key equations determining equilibrium
From their deﬁnitions, cl(a), ch(a); c
¤; and ca are functions of cm and a¤:
cl(a) =
km
lm
Al(a)
Ak(a)
cm; ch(a) =
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
Ah(a)
Ak(a)
cm; (13)
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Figure 2: Values of c¤ and ca on the (a¤; cm) space when kakm <
la
lm
c¤ = min
n
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ak(a¤)
cm;1
o
, ca = min
n
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm;1
o
: (14)
From the equations deﬁning a¤ and cm, earnings too are functions of cm and a¤:
wl =
lm
km
r
cm
; (15)
wh =
lm
km
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
r
cm
: (16)
Hence, the two key equations determining equilibrium, the ﬁrst equality of (10) and (12),
can be expressed as simultaneous equations of cm and a
¤ (see Figure 1 for the derivation):
Nh
Nl
Z a¤
0
Z minfcl(a);1g
0
1
Al(a)
dcda =
Z 1
a¤
Z minfch(a);1g
0
1
Ah(a)
dcda; (HL)
lm
km
r
cm
Z a¤
0
Z minfcl(a);1g
0
dcda
Al(a)
+
lm
km
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
r
cm
Z 1
a¤
Z minfch(a);1g
0
dcda
Ah(a)
+r
·Z a¤
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
dcda
cAk(a)
+
Z 1
a¤
Z 1
minfch(a);1g
dadc
cAk(a)
¸
= 1; (P)
Once a¤and cm are determined from (HL) and (P), c¤; ca; cl(a); ch(a) and thus task assign-
ment are determined. Then, earnings are determined from (15) and (16), and the remaining
variables are determined as stated in the deﬁnition of equilibrium of the previous section.
The determination of equilibrium a¤and cm can be illustrated graphically using a ﬁgure
depicting graphs of the key equations on the (a¤; cm) space. Since, as shown below, the
shape of (HL) diﬀers depending on whether c¤ and ca equal 1 or not, using (14), the (a¤; cm)
space is divided into three regions based on values of c¤ and ca (Figure 2).
When cm ¸ lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, Al(a¤)
1£Ak(a¤) ¸ lmcmkm =
wl
r
, that is, when an unskilled worker is
weakly chosen over a machine at task (a; c) = (a¤; 1), machines are not used in any tasks
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with a > a¤ and thus c¤ = ca = 1 holds. When cm ¸ lmkm kah
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, h
1£ka ¸ lmcmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
= wh
r
and cm <
lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, that is, when a skilled worker is weakly chosen over a machine at task
(a; c)=(1; 1) and a machine is strictly chosen over an unskilled worker at task (a; c)=(a¤; 1),
machines are employed in some tasks with a > a¤ but not in tasks with a = 1 and c < 1;
thus c¤ < ca = 1 holds. Finally, when cm < lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, machines are employed in some tasks
with a = 1 and c < 1 and thus c¤ < ca < 1 holds.
3.3 Shape of (HL) and its relations with exogenous variables
Now the shape of (HL) and its relations with exogenous variables are examined. Note that
the results do not depend on the assumption ka
km
< la
lm
. Lemma 1 presents the result when
c¤; ca < 1 (c¤ < (>)ca when kakm < (>)
h
lm
), the area below cm =
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
of Figure 2. No
assumptions are imposed regarding magnitude relations of analytical abilities to manual
abilities, although presentations in the lemmas appear to suppose h > lm, lm > la, and
km > ka.
Lemma 1When cm <
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, c¤; ca < 1 (c¤ < (>)ca when kakm < (>) hlm ), (HL) is
expressed as
Nh
Nl
ln
µ
km
Ak(a¤)
¶
=
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
ln
µ
Ak(a
¤)
ka
¶
; when
ka
km
6=1; (17)
Nh
Nl
a¤ =
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
(1¡a¤); when ka
km
=1: (18)
a¤ satisfying the equation decreases with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
.
Unlike the other cases below, (HL) is independent of cm. a
¤ satisfying the equation
decreases with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
. As will be seen, the relation with Nh
Nl
is negative in all the
cases, while the one with ka
km
diﬀers in each case. The next lemma presents the result when
c¤ < ca = 1, the area below cm = lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
and on or above cm =
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
of Figure 2.
This case arises only when lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
> lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, ka
km
< h
lm
:
Lemma 2When cm2
h
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
; lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
´
, c¤ < ca = 1, which arises only when kakm < hlm ,
(HL) is expressed as
when
ka
km
6=1; Nh
Nl
km
lm
cm
km¡ka ln
µ
km
Ak(a¤)
¶
=
1
h¡lm ln
"
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
+(h¡lm)cm
lm
km
Ah(a¤)
Al(a¤)
(hkm¡lmka)
h
#
+
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm
km¡ka ln
"
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
+(h¡lm)cm
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a¤)
#
;
(19)
when
ka
km
=1;
Nh
Nl
cma
¤
lm
=
1
h¡lm
½
ln
·
h
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm¸ ¡Al(a
¤)
lm
cm+1
¾
: (20)
a¤ satisfying the equation decreases with cm and NhNl (
@a¤
@cm
= 0 at cm =
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
), and
decreases (increases) with ka
km
for small (large) cm.
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(a) Relation of (HL) with Nh
Nl
(b) Relation of (HL) with ka
km
Figure 3: Shape of (HL) and its relations with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
Unlike the previous case, a¤ satisfying (HL) decreases with cm (except at cm= lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
;
where @a
¤
@cm
= 0); and it increases with ka
km
when cm is large. Finally, the next lemma presents
the result when c¤=ca=1; the area on or above cm = lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
of Figure 2. This case arises
only when lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
< 1, ka
km
< la
lm
:
Lemma 3When cm ¸ lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, c¤ = ca = 1, which arises only when kakm < lalm , (HL) is
expressed as
Nh
Nl
½
1
lm¡la ln
·
lakm¡lmka
(km¡ka)lm¡(lm¡la)kmcm
lm
Al(a¤)
¸
+
kmcm
(km¡ka)lmln
·
(km¡ka)lm¡(lm¡la)kmcm
(lakm¡lmka)cm
¾¸
=
1
h¡lm ln
µ
h
Ah(a¤)
¶
; when
ka
km
6=1; (21)
Nh
Nl
1
la¡lm
½
ln
·
cmAl(a
¤)
lm
¸
+1¡cm
¾
=
1
h¡lm ln
µ
h
Ah(a¤)
¶
; when
ka
km
=1; (22)
where a¤ 2 (0; 1) holds for any cm. a¤ satisfying the equation decreases with cm and NhNl ; and
it increases with ka
km
(limcm!1
@a¤
@cm
=limcm!1
@a¤
@ ka
km
=0).
a¤ satisfying (HL) decreases with cm as in the previous case, while it increases with kakm
(limcm!1
@a¤
@cm
=limcm!1
@a¤
@ ka
km
=0, though).
Figure 3 illustrates (HL) on the (a¤; cm) space and shows its relations with NhNl and
ka
km
.
The shape of (HL); i.e. negatively sloped when ca = 1 and vertical when ca < 1; can be
explained intuitively for the case ka
km
< la
lm
as follows. A decrease in cm lowers cl(a) and
ch(a) from (13) and thus raises the proportion of tasks performed by machines (see Figure
1). When ca = 1; that is, machines do not perform any tasks with a = 1 and c < 1, the
11
mechanization mainly aﬀects unskilled workers engaged in relatively manual tasks and thus
they shift to more analytical tasks, i.e. a¤ increases. By contrast, when ca< 1, both types
of workers are equally aﬀected and thus a¤ remains unchanged. Obviously, an increase in
Nh
Nl
implies that a higher portion of tasks must be engaged by skilled workers and thus (HL)
shifts to the left. Less straightforward is the eﬀect of an increase in ka
km
, which shifts the
locus to the right (left) when cm is high (low), deﬁnitely so when c
¤ = 1 (when ca < 1).
An increase in ka
km
weakens comparative advantages of humans in analytical tasks and thus
lowers cl(a) and ch(a) (from equation 13) and the portion of tasks performed by humans
(see Figure 1). When cm (thus c
¤ and ca too) is high, such mechanization mainly aﬀects
unskilled workers engaged in relatively manual tasks and thus a¤ must increase, while the
opposite is true when cm is low.
3.4 Shape of (P) and its relations with exogenous variables
The next lemma presents the shape of (P) and its relations with km, ka; and r.
Lemma 4 cm satisfying (P ); which is positive, increases with a
¤ and r, and decreases with
km and ka.
Figure 4: Shape of (P) and its relations with km; ka; and r
Figure 4 illustrates the shape of (P) and its relations with the exogenous variables.
Remember that, for (P) to hold, task assignment must be determined so that the unit
production cost of the ﬁnal good equals 1. When cm increases, a
¤ must increase, that is, (P)
is upward-sloping on the (a¤; cm) plane, because, otherwise, both wl= lmkm
r
cm
and wh=
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
wl
fall and thus the unit production cost would decrease. An increase in r raises the cost of
hiring machines and thus a higher portion of tasks are assigned to humans, i.e. the locus
shifts upward, while the opposite holds when abilities of machines, km and ka; increase. The
locus never intersects with cm = 0; because machines are completely useless and thus hiring
machines are prohibitively expensive at the hardest-to-codify tasks.
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Figure 5: Determination of equilibrium a¤ and cm
As Figure 5 illustrates, equilibrium (a¤; cm) is determined at the intersection of the two
loci. Of course, the position of the intersection depends on exogenous variables such as km
and ka. The next two sections examine how increases in km, ka; and
Nh
Nl
aﬀect the equilibrium,
particularly, task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output.
4 Mechanization with constant kakm
Suppose that abilities of machines, km and ka, improve exogenously over time. This section
examines eﬀects of such productivity growth and an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment,
earnings, earnings inequality, and output, when km and ka satisfying
ka
km
< la
lm
grow propor-
tionately. As shown in Lemmas 1¡3, (HL) does not shift under constant ka
km
and thus the
analysis is much simpler than the general case analyzed in the next section.
The next proposition presents the dynamics of the critical variables and functions deter-
mining task assignment of an economy undergoing the productivity growth.
Proposition 1 Suppose that km and ka satisfying
ka
km
< la
lm
grow over time with ka
km
constant.
(i)When km is very low initially, cm = c
¤ = ca = 1 is satisﬁed at ﬁrst; at some point,
cm<c
¤= ca=1 holds and thereafter cm falls over time; then, cm<c¤<ca=1 and c¤ too
falls; ﬁnally, cm<c
¤<ca<1 and ca falls as well.
(ii) a¤ increases over time when cm < ca = 1, while a¤ is time-invariant when ca < 1 (and
when cm=1).
(iii) cl(a) and ch(a) (when c
¤<1) decrease over time when cm<1.
The results of this proposition can be understood graphically using ﬁgures similar to those
in the previous section. When the level of km is very low, there are no (a
¤; cm) satisfying (P);
or (P) is located at the left side of (HL) on the (a¤; cm) plane (see Figure 6 (a)). Hence, the
two loci do not intersect and an equilibrium with cm<1 does not exist. Because the manual
13
(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment
Figure 6: Equilibrium and task assignment when cm = c
¤ = ca = 1
ability of machines is very low, hiring machines is not proﬁtable at all and thus all tasks are
performed by humans, i.e. cm=1. Figure 6 (a) illustrates an example of the determination
of equilibrium cm and a
¤ in this case. Equilibrium a¤ is determined at the intersection of
(HL) with cm=1. Figure 6 (b) illustrates the corresponding task assignment on the (a; c)
plane, which shows that unskilled (skilled) workers perform all tasks with a< (>)a¤:
When km becomes high enough that (P) is located at the right side of (HL) at cm=1,
the two loci intersect and thus machines begin to be used, i.e. cm< 1. Note that ka is not
important for the ﬁrst step of mechanization, because mechanization starts from the most
manual tasks in which analytical ability is of no use. Because of low machine productivities,
they perform only highly manual and easy-to-codify tasks that were previously performed
by unskilled workers, i.e. c¤= ca=1 holds. Figure 7 (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the
determination of equilibrium cm and a
¤ and task assignment. Figure 7 (c) presents the eﬀect
of small increases in km and ka on the task assignment. Since machines come to perform a
greater portion of highly manual and easy-to-codify tasks, a¤ increases and cl(a) decreases,
that is, workers shift to more analytical and, for unskilled workers, harder-to-routinize tasks.
As km and ka grow over time, mechanization spreads to relatively analytical tasks as
well, and eventually, machines come to perform highly analytical tasks, those previously
performed by skilled workers. Figure 8 (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the determination
of equilibrium cm and a
¤ and task assignment when cm < c¤ < ca = 1. Machines perform
some tasks with a > a¤ but not the most analytical ones, i.e. c¤ < ca = 1. Productivity
growth lowers ch(a) as well as cl(a) (and raises a
¤), thus skilled workers too shift to more
diﬃcult-to-codify tasks (Figure 8 (c)).
Finally, the economy reaches the case cm<c
¤<ca< 1, which is illustrated in Figure 9.
Machines perform a portion of the most analytical tasks, i.e. ca < 1: Unlike the previous
cases, productivity growth aﬀects two type of workers equally and thus a¤ does not change,
while ch(a) and cl(a) decrease and thus workers shift to more diﬃcult-to-codify tasks.
To summarize, when manual and analytical abilities of machines with ka
km
< la
lm
im-
prove proportionately over time, mechanization starts from highly manual and easy-to-codify
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(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment (c) Eﬀect of productivity
growth with constant ka
km
on
task assignment
Figure 7: Equilibrium, task assignment, and the eﬀect of productivity growth with constant
ka
km
when cm < c
¤ = ca = 1
(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment (c) Eﬀect of productivity
growth with constant ka
km
on
task assignment
Figure 8: Equilibrium, task assignment, and the eﬀect of productivity growth with constant
ka
km
when cm < c
¤ < ca = 1
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(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment (c) Eﬀect of productivity
growth with constant ka
km
on
task assignment
Figure 9: Equilibrium, task assignment, and the eﬀect of productivity growth with constant
ka
km
when cm < c
¤ < ca < 1
tasks and gradually spreads to more analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks. Eventually,
machines come to perform highly analytical tasks, those previously performed by skilled
workers. Accordingly, workers shift to tasks that are more diﬃcult to codify and, except at
the ﬁnal stage, more analytical.
The dynamics of task assignment accord with long-run trends of mechanization and of
shifts in tasks performed by humans (except job polarization after the 1990s) detailed in the
introduction, which is summarized as: initially, mechanization proceeded in tasks intensive
in manual labor, while mechanization of tasks intensive in analytical labor started during
the Second Industrial Revolution and has progressed on a large scale in the post World War
II era, especially since the 1970s, because of the rapid growth of IT technologies; humans
shifted from manual tasks to analytical tasks until about the 1960s, whereas, thereafter,
they have shifted away from routine analytical tasks as well as routine manual tasks toward
non-routine manual tasks in services as well as non-routine analytical tasks.15
Eﬀects of the productivity growth on earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output
are examined in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that km and ka satisfying
ka
km
< la
lm
grow proportionately over time
when cm<1.
(i) Earnings of skilled workers increase over time. When c¤ < ca < 1, earnings of unskilled
workers too increase.
(ii) Earnings inequality, wh
wl
, rises over time when ca=1 and is time-invariant when ca<1.
15Acemoglu and Autor (2011) document that the employment share of service occupations, which is
intensive in non-routine manual tasks, continued to rise between 1959¡2007 and the rise is large after the
1990s, while Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) ﬁnd that the share of non-routine manual tasks in total tasks
performed by humans continued to fall in the U.S. economy between 1960 and 1998 (although the fall is
moderate in the 1990s). A likely reason of the decrease in the share is a large fall in the employment share
of production occupations, which is intensive in non-routine as well as routine manual tasks.
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(a) when cm< c
¤=ca=1 (b) when cm< c¤< ca=1 (c) when cm< c¤< ca< 1
Figure 10: Eﬀect of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment when ka
km
< la
lm
(iii) The output of the ﬁnal good, Y; increases over time.
The proposition shows that, while skilled workers always beneﬁt from mechanization,
the eﬀect on earnings of unskilled workers is ambiguous when mechanization mainly aﬀects
them, i.e. when ca = 1; and the eﬀect turns positive when ca < 1. Mechanization worsens
earnings inequality, wh
wl
, when ca=1; while it has no eﬀect when ca< 1. The output of the
ﬁnal good always increases, even if la<h< lm and thus workers’ productivities, Ah(a) and
Al(a), fall as they shift to more analytical tasks.
So far, the proportion of skilled workers to unskilled workers, Nh
Nl
, is held constant, which
has increased over time in real economy. Thus, the next proposition examines eﬀects of the
growth of Nh
Nl
under constant machine qualities.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Nh
Nl
grows over time when ka
km
< la
lm
and cm<1.
(i) cm, a
¤, c¤ (when c¤<1); and cl(a) decrease, while ca (when ca<1) and ch(a) (when c¤<1)
increase over time.
(ii) wl (wh) rises (falls) and earnings inequality,
wh
wl
, shrinks over time.
(iii) Y increases over time under constant Nh+Nl.
Figure 10 illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment. Since skilled
workers become abundant relative to unskilled workers, they take over a portion of tasks
previously performed by unskilled workers, i.e. a¤ decreases. Further, earnings of unskilled
workers rise and those of skilled workers fall, thus some tasks previously performed by
unskilled workers are mechanized, i.e. cl(a) decreases, while, when c
¤ < 1, skilled workers
take over some tasks performed by machines before, i.e. ch(a) increases. That is, skilled
workers shift to more manual tasks, and unskilled workers shift to harder-to-routinize tasks.
The output of the ﬁnal good increases even when the total population is constant, mainly
because skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers at any tasks with a > 0.
By combining the results on eﬀects of an increase in Nh
Nl
with those of the productivity
growth, the model can explain long-run trends of earnings and earnings inequality until
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the 1970s (except the wartime 1940s) detailed in the introduction, which is: in the early
stage of industrialization when the growth of the relative supply of skilled workers was slow,
earnings of unskilled workers grew very moderately and earnings inequality rose; in later
periods when the relative supply of skilled workers grew faster, unskilled workers beneﬁted
more from mechanization, while, as before, the rising inequality was the norm in economies
with lightly regulated labor markets (such as the U.S.), except in periods of rapid growth
of the education level of the population and in the 1940s, when the inequality fell.16
The model, however, fails to capture the trends after the 1980s, which is: earnings of
unskilled workers stagnated and those of skilled workers rose until the mid 1990s in the
U.S.;17 the inequality rose greatly in the 1980s, and wage polarization has proceeded since
the 1990s in economies including the U.S. By contrast, the model predicts that earnings
of unskilled workers increase and the inequality shrinks when highly analytical tasks are
aﬀected by mechanization, i.e. when ca<1, and the relative supply of skilled workers rises.
5 Mechanization with time-varying kakm
The previous section has examined the case in which km and ka grow proportionately. This
special case has been taken up ﬁrst for analytical simplicity. However, the assumption of the
proportionate growth is rather restrictive, because, according to the trend of mechanization
described in the introduction, the growth of km was apparently faster than that of ka before
World War II, while ka seems to have grown faster than km most recently.
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This section examines the general case in which they may grow at diﬀerent rates. This
case is much more diﬃcult to analyze because, as shown in Lemmas 1¡3, a change in ka
km
shifts the graph of (HL) as well as that of (P) (see Figures 3 (b) and 4).
Starting from the situation where ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
) holds, if ka keeps growing faster than
km, i.e. the rapid growth of IT technologies is long-lasting,
ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
), then ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
)
come to be satisﬁed. That is, comparative advantages of machines to two type of workers
change over time. When ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
); c¤ < 1 holds, and when ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
); ca < c
¤ < 1
holds from c¤ = min
n
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ak(a¤)
cm;1
o
and ca = min
n
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm;1
o
(see Figure 11).
Figure 12 illustrates cl(a) and ch(a) and thus task assignment on the (a; c) space when
ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
) (the ﬁgure is drawn assuming ca < 1) and when
ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
). Unlike the
original case ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
), cl(a) is downward sloping and, when
ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
), ch(c) too is
downward sloping. Hence, when ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
); for given c; machines tend to perform tasks
16Combined eﬀects of an increase in NhNl and improvements of machine qualities on task assignment accord
with the trend of task shifts in real economy when c¤=1: When c¤< 1, they are consistent with the fact,
unless the negative eﬀect of an increase in NhNl on ch(a) is strong (see Figure 10).
17According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), real wages of full-time male workers without college degrees
are lower in 1995 than in 1980, while wages of those with more than college education are higher. As for
female workers, real wages rose during the period except for high school dropouts, but the rise was moderate
for those without college degrees.
18Note that ka seems to have been positive even before the Industrial Revolution: various machines had
automatic control systems whose major examples are ﬂoat valve regulators used in ancient Greece and in
the medieval Arab world to control devices such as water clocks, oil lamps, and the level of water in tanks,
and temperature regulators of furnaces invented in early 17th century Europe.
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(a) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) (b) when ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
)
Figure 11: c¤ and ca on the (a¤; cm) space when kakm 2( lalm ; hlm ) and when kakm > hlm (> lalm )
(a) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) (b) when ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
)
Figure 12: cl(a) and ch(a) when
ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) (ca<1 is assumed) and when
ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
)
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with intermediate a and the proportion of tasks performed by machines is highest at a = a¤.
When ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
), for given c; machines tend to perform relatively analytical tasks and
the proportion of tasks performed by machines increases with a.
Now, eﬀects of changes in km and ka on task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality,
and output are examined. Since results are diﬀerent depending on the shape of (HL) (note
Lemmas 1¡3), they are presented in three separate propositions.19;20 The next proposition
analyzes the case cm¸ lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, c¤=ca=1; which arises only when kakm < lalm .
Proposition 4When cm¸ lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, c¤=ca=1 (possible only when kakm < lalm ),
(i) cm decreases and a
¤ increases with km and ka (limcm!1
da¤
dkm
=limcm!1
da¤
dka
=0):
(ii) cl(a) decreases with km and ka.
(iii) wh,
wh
wl
, and Y increase with km and ka: wl increases with ka.
The only diﬀerence from the constant ka
km
case is that wl increases when ka rises with
km unchanged. As before, with improved machine qualities, cm and cl(a) decrease and a
¤
increases, that is, workers shift to more analytical and, for unskilled workers, harder-to-codify
tasks, and earnings of skilled workers, earnings inequality wh
wl
, and output rise.
The next proposition examines the case cm2
h
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
; lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
´
, c¤<ca=1, which is
possible only when ka
km
< h
lm
:
Proposition 5When cm2
h
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
; lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
´
,c¤<ca=1 (possible only when kakm < hlm ),
(i) cm decreases with km and ka. a
¤ increases when ka
km
non-increases.
(ii) cl(a) and ch(a) decrease with km and ka.
(iii) wh and Y increase with km and ka, while wl increases with ka.
wh
wl
increases when ka
km
non-increases.
There are several diﬀerences from the constant ka
km
case. First, eﬀects of productivity
growth with increasing ka
km
on a¤ and earnings inequality are ambiguous, and wl increases
with ka: Second, although cl(a) (thus cm) and ch(a) decrease as in the original case and thus
workers shift to harder-to-routinize tasks, workers may not shift to more analytical tasks
when a¤ decreases (possible only when ka
km
increases) and when ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
) (see Figure
12 (a)). Remaining results are same as before, that is, workers shift to more analytical
and harder-to-codify tasks and earnings inequality rises when ka
km
non-increases (the shift of
unskilled workers to more analytical tasks is true when ka
km
· la
lm
too holds), and earnings of
skilled workers and output rise.
Proposition 6 examines the case cm<
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
,c¤; ca<1 (c¤<(>)ca when kakm <(>) hlm ).
Proposition 6When cm <
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, c¤; ca < 1 (c¤<(>)ca when kakm <(>) hlm ),
(i) cm and ca decrease with km and ka; and a
¤ decreases with ka
km
.
(ii) cl(a) and ch(a) decrease with km and ka:
(iii) wh and Y increase with km and ka, while wl increases when
ka
km
non-decreases. wh
wl
decreases with ka
km
.
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(a) when ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
) (b) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) (c) when ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
)
Figure 13: Eﬀect of productivity growth with increasing ka
km
when cm < c
¤ < ca < 1
Unlike the constant ka
km
case, a¤ and thus wh
wl
decrease with ka
km
, and the eﬀect on wl is am-
biguous when ka
km
decreases. As for task assignment, while cl(a) (thus cm) and ch(a) decrease
as in the original case (thus workers shift to harder-to-routinize tasks), tasks performed by
humans change in the skill dimension as well. In particular, when ka
km
rises (falls), that is,
when productivity growth is such that comparative advantages of machines to humans in
analytical (manual) tasks increase, unskilled workers shift to more manual (analytical) tasks
under ka
km
>(<) la
lm
, and skilled workers too shift to such tasks under ka
km
>(<) h
lm
.21 Figure 13
illustrates the eﬀect of productivity growth with increasing ka
km
on task assignment. Earnings
of skilled workers and output rise as before.
Finally, Proposition 7 examines eﬀects of an increase in Nh
Nl
when ka
km
¸ la
lm
is allowed.
Proposition 7 Suppose that Nh
Nl
grows over time when cm<1.
(i) cm, a
¤; and cl(a) decrease, while ca (when ca < 1) and ch(a) (when c¤<1) increase over
time. c¤ (when c¤<1) falls (rises) when ka
km
· la
lm
( ka
km
¸ h
lm
).
(ii) wl (wh) rises (falls) and
wh
wl
shrinks over time.
(iii) Y increases over time under constant Nh+Nl.
Figure 14 illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
)
and when ka
km
> h
lm
. (Note that c¤=ca=1 does not arise in these cases and c¤< ca=1 does not
arise when ka
km
> h
lm
:) As in the original case of ka
km
< la
lm
, skilled workers take over some tasks
19When kakm >
la
lm
, cm = 1 is possible with c¤ or ca < 1. However, such situation ¡the most manual and
easy-to-codify task is not mechanized while some of other tasks are ¡ is unrealistic and thus is not examined.
20As mentioned in the introduction, proofs of these propositions and Proposition 7 are very lengthy and
thus are posted on the author’s web site.
21When kakm rises (falls) under
ka
km
< (>)lalm , unskilled workers shift to more manual (analytical) tasks at
low c. The same is true for skilled workers under kakm <(>)
h
lm
. At high c, when kakm rises (falls) under
ka
km
< hlm
( kakm >
la
lm
), skilled (unskilled) workers shift to more analytical (manual) tasks. (See Figure 13.)
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(a) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) and
cm< c
¤< ca=1
(b) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) and
cm< c
¤< ca< 1
(c) when ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
) and
cm< c
¤< ca< 1
Figure 14: Eﬀect of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment when ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
) and when
ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
)
previously performed by unskilled workers, i.e. a¤ decreases, and machines (skilled workers)
come to perform a portion of tasks performed by unskilled workers (machines) before, i.e.
cl(a) decreases (ch(a) increases). However, unlike before, cl(a) is downward-sloping on the
(a; c) plane, and, when ka
km
> h
lm
, ch(a) too is downward-sloping. Thus, unskilled workers
shift to harder-to-routinize and more manual tasks and, when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
); skilled workers
shift to more manual tasks (see the ﬁgure). As in the original case, earnings of unskilled
(skilled) workers rise (fall), earnings inequality shrinks, and output increases.
Based on the propositions, it is examined whether the model with general productivity
growth can explain long-run trends of task shifts, earnings, and earnings inequality in real
economy. Since the proportion of tasks performed by machines seems to have been and
be higher in more manual tasks (consider, for example, the low proportion in non-routine
analytical tasks mainly associated with management, professional, and technical jobs), it
would be plausible to suppose that ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
) has continued to hold until now, although
it may change in future (thus cl(a) and ch(a) are downward-sloping on the (a; c) plane).
Judging from the history of mechanization and task shifts described in the introduction, km
seems to have grown faster than ka in most periods of time until around the early 1990s, after
which the growth of ka appears to be faster due to the rapid growth of practical applications
of IT technologies.22;23 Thus, suppose that ka
km
falls over time when ca=1; while, when ca<1,
ka
km
falls initially, then rises over time.
22It is true that several components of the ”composite” analytical ability ka, such as simple calculation,
seems to have risen faster than the ”composite” manual ability km since earlier periods, but remaining
components seem to have grown slowly until recently.
23The supposed turning point would be not be far oﬀ the mark considering that a decrease in the em-
ployment share of production occupations, which are intensive in manual tasks, is greatest in the 1980s and
slowed down considerably after the 1990s, while a decrease in the share of clerical occupations accelerated
after the 1990s, according to Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
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First, the dynamics of earnings and earnings inequality are examined. Since the result
when c¤ = ca = 1 is almost the same as the constant kakm case, the model is consistent with
the actual trends in the early stage of mechanization. It accords with the trends in the
intermediate stage (when c¤ = ca < 1) as well (except a sharp decline of the inequality in
the wartime 1940s), because the result is same as before when ka
km
falls. Further, unlike
the constant ka
km
case, the model could explain stagnant earnings of unskilled workers in
the 1980s and the early 1990s and the large inequality rise in the 1980s, because the eﬀect
of productivity growth with decreasing ka
km
on their earnings is ambiguous and that on the
inequality is positive when c¤<ca<1 (and the growth of NhNl slowed down during the period).
When ka
km
rises under c¤<ca<1, earnings of unskilled workers too grow, which is consistent
with the development in the 1990s and the early 2000s.24 Although the model with two
types of workers cannot explain wage polarization after the 1990s, the falling inequality
predicted by the model may capture a part of the development, the shrinking inequality
between low-skill and middle-skill workers (most recently, mildly high-skill workers as well).
As for the dynamics of task shifts, the result under c¤= ca=1 is same as the constant
ka
km
case, and so is the result under c¤ < ca = 1 when kakm <
la
lm
and ka
km
falls: cl(a) and
ch(a) decrease, and a
¤ increase over time, unless Nh
Nl
grows very strongly for ch(a) and a
¤.
Hence, the dynamics accord with the long-run trend until recently, i.e. workers shift to more
analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks over time. By contrast, when c¤<ca<1; while cl(a)
and ch(a) decrease over time (unless the growth of
Nh
Nl
is very strong for ch(a)) as before,
unlike the constant ka
km
case, a¤ increases (decreases) when ka
km
falls (rises). Hence, workers
shift to more analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks while ka
km
falls, whereas after ka
km
starts
to rise, they shift to harder-to-codify tasks overall and shift to more manual tasks at low c
(footnote 21), which may be consistent with the fact that the shift to non-routine manual
tasks in services increased after the 1990s (footnote 15), although the model cannot explain
recent job polarization.
To summarize, the model with realistic productivity growth could explain long-run trends
of task shifts, earnings, and earnings inequality, except job and wage polarization after the
1990s and a sharp decline of the inequality in the wartime 1940s.
If the rapid progress of IT technologies continues and ka
km
keeps rising, comparative ad-
vantages of machines to two type of workers could change over time, i.e. ﬁrst, from ka
km
< la
lm
to ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
), then to ka
km
> h
lm
. The model predicts what will happen to task assignment,
earnings, and earnings inequality under such situations. As before, both types of workers
shift to tasks that are more diﬃcult to routinize (unless Nh
Nl
rises greatly, which is very un-
likely). By contrast, unlike before, unskilled workers shift to more manual tasks, and, when
ka
km
> h
lm
(and Nh
Nl
does not grow strongly), skilled workers too shift to such tasks (see Figures
13 and 14). That is, workers will shift to relatively manual and diﬃcult-to-codify tasks: the
growth of service occupations such as personal care and protective service may continue into
24According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), real wages of full-time workers of all education groups ex-
hibited sound growth in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s in the U.S. Earnings growth of low education
groups are stronger for females, probably because a higher proportion of them are in growing service occu-
pations. After around 2004, however, earnings of all groups except male workers with post-college education
have stagnated.
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the future. Earnings of unskilled workers as well as those of skilled workers will rise, and
earnings inequality will shrink over time, although the analysis based on the model with
two types of workers would not capture the total picture, considering the recent widening
inequality between mildly and extremely high-skill workers.
6 Conclusion
Since the Industrial Revolution, mechanization has strongly aﬀected types of tasks humans
perform, relative demands for workers of diﬀerent skill levels, their earnings, earnings in-
equality, and aggregate output. This paper has developed a Ricardian model of task as-
signment and examined how improvements of qualities of machines and an increase in the
relative supply of skilled workers aﬀect these variables. The analysis has shown that tasks
and workers strongly aﬀected by the productivity growth change over time. The model can
capture long-run trends of these variables in real economy except job and wage polarization
after the 1990s and a sharp decline of the inequality in the wartime 1940s. The model
has also been employed to examine possible future trends of these variables when the rapid
growth of IT technologies continues.
Several extensions of the model would be fruitful. First, in order to understand recent
job and wage polarization and future trends of the variables, the model with more than
two type of workers, who are diﬀerent in levels of analytical ability or ability in non-routine
tasks, could be developed. Second, some empirical works ﬁnd that international trade and
oﬀshoring have important eﬀects on earnings inequality,25 thus it may be interesting to
examine eﬀects of these factors and productivity growth jointly.
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Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. [Derivation of the LHS of the equation]: When cm <
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
and thus cm<
lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, c¤=cl(a¤)<1, the LHS of (HL) equals NhNl timesZ a¤
0
Z cl(a)
0
1
Al(a)
dcda=
Z a¤
0
cl(a)
Al(a)
da=
km
lm
cm
Z a¤
0
da
Ak(a)
: (23)
Hence, when ka
km
6=1; the LHS of (HL) equals
Nh
Nl
km
lm
cm
km¡ka ln
µ
km
Ak(a¤)
¶
: (24)
Applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
=1 equals
¡Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
lim ka
km
!1(1¡ kakm )
lim
ka
km
!1
ln
µ
a¤
ka
km
+1¡a¤
¶
=
Nh
Nl
cm
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
Ã
a¤
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤
!
=
Nh
Nl
cma
¤
lm
: (25)
[Derivation of the RHS of the equation]: When cm <
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, ca= ch(1)<1,
the RHS of (HL) is expressed asZ 1
a¤
Z ch(a)
0
1
Ah(a)
dcda=
Z 1
a¤
ch(a)
Ah(a)
da=
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm
Z 1
a¤
da
Ak(a)
: (26)
Hence, when ka
km
6=1; the RHS of (HL) equals
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm
km¡ka ln
µ
Ak(a
¤)
ka
¶
: (27)
By applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
=1 equals
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
1
lm
cm
lim ka
km
!1(1¡ kakm )
lim
ka
km
!1
ln
·
a¤+(1¡a¤)km
ka
¸
=¡Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
Ã
¡(1¡a¤)( ka
km
)¡2
a¤+(1¡a¤)km
ka
!
=
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm
lm
(1¡a¤): (28)
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[Relations of a¤ satisfying the equation with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
]: Clearly, a¤ satisfying
the equation decreases with Nh
Nl
. Noting that, from (24) and (27), (HL) when ka
km
6=1 can be
expressed as
km
lm
cm
km¡ka
·
¡Nh
Nl
ln
µ
a¤
ka
km
+1¡a¤
¶
¡ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
ln
µ
a¤+(1¡a¤)km
ka
¶¸
=0; (29)
the derivative of the above equation with respect to ka
km
equals
km
lm
cm
km¡ka
Ã
¡Nh
Nl
a¤
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤¡
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
¡(1¡a¤)( ka
km
)¡2
a¤+(1¡a¤)km
ka
!
=
km
lm
cm
km¡ka
km
Ak(a¤)
·
¡Nh
Nl
a¤+
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¤)
Ah(a¤)
(1¡a¤)km
ka
;¸ (30)
where the expression inside the large bracket can be rewritten as
¡ Nh
Nl
a¤+
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
(1¡a¤)km
ka
=
·
ln
µ
Ak(a
¤)
ka
¶¸ ¡1
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: (31)
The expression inside the large bracket of the above equation is positive, because the
expression equals 0 at ka
km
= 1 and its derivative with respect to ka
km
equals
a¤
·
ln
µ
ka
km
¶
¡ln
µ
a¤
ka
km
+1¡a¤
¶¸
; (32)
which is negative (positive) for ka
km
< (>)1: Thus, noting that ln
³
Ak(a
¤)
ka
´
> (<)0 for ka
km
< (>
)1, (30) is positive. The derivative of (29) with respect to a¤ is positive from @ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
=@a¤ < 0.
Hence, a¤ satisfying (17) decreases with ka
km
when ka
km
6=1. When ka
km
! 1; (30) equals
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where (18) is used to derived the last equality. Hence, the same result holds when ka
km
= 1
as well.
Proof of Lemma 2. [Derivation of the equation]: Since c¤ < 1, the LHS of (HL)
equals (24) (when ka
km
6=1) and (25) (when ka
km
=1) in the proof of Lemma 1.
The RHS of (HL) when ca = 1, ch(1)¸1, c¤ < 1, ch(a¤)<1, and kakm 6=1 is expressed
as
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(34)
where c¡1h (1); i.e. the value of a when ch(a) = 1, equals, from (1) and (3),
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By applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule to the above equation, the RHS when ka
km
=1 equals
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[Relations of a¤ satisfying the equation with Nh
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and cm]: When
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where the last equality is derived by using
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
+(h¡lm)cm
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a¤)
=
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
+(h¡lm)cm¡ (hkm¡lmka)cmAk(a¤) +
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a¤)
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a¤)
= 1+
(km¡ka)Ah(a¤)Ak(a¤)
h
lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
¡cm
i
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a¤)
>(<)1 when
ka
km
<(>)1 ( * cm< lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
). (41)
The derivative of the LHS-RHS of (19) with respect to cm when
ka
km
6=1 equals
1
(h¡lm)cm ln
·
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
lm
km
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
h¸ ¡
1+ km
lm
cm
km¡ka
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
(h¡lm)
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a¤)
Al(a¤)
+(h¡lm)cm
+
km
lm
1
km¡ka
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
(42)
=
1
(h¡lm)cm ln
·
1+
(h¡lm)hkm
h
cm¡ lmh kakm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)
i
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
¸
¸ 0 ( * cm¸ lmkm kah
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
); (43)
where the last equality is derived by using
29
(km¡ka)lmAh(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)kmcm
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
h =
h
(km¡ka)lmAh(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)kmcm
i
h¡lmAh(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)+lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
= 1+
(h¡lm)hkm
h
cm¡ lmh kakm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)
i
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
: (44)
Hence, when ka
km
6= 1, a¤ satisfying (19) decreases with Nh
Nl
and cm (
@a¤
@cm
= 0 at cm =
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
).
The corresponding derivatives when ka
km
! 1 are
a¤ : lim
ka
km
!1
Ã
1
lm
cm
1¡ ka
km
(³
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)´
1¡ ka
km
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤¡
@ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
@a¤
ln
·
1+
(1¡ ka
km
)Ah(a
¤)
h
(a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤) lm
Al(a
¤)¡cm
i
(h¡lm kakm )cm
)¸!
= ¡cm
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
8>><>>:
³
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)´
¡(a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤)¡(1¡ ka
km
)(1¡a¤)
(a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤)2 ¡
@
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a
¤)
@a¤
·
1+
(1¡ ka
km
)Ah(a
¤)
h
(a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤) lm
Al(a
¤)¡cm
i
(h¡lm kakm )cm
¡¸1
£ (h¡lm
ka
km
)Ah(a
¤)
h
¡

(a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤) lm
Al(a
¤)¡cm

+(1¡ ka
km
)
(1¡a¤)lm
Al(a
¤)
i
+lm(1¡ kakm)Ah(a
¤)
h
(a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤) lm
Al(a
¤)¡cm
i
(h¡lm kakm )2cm
9>>=>>;
=
cm
lm
(³
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)´
¡
@ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
@a¤
Ah(a
¤)

lm
Al(a
¤)¡cm

(h¡lm)cm
)
> 0; (45)
cm :
1
(h¡lm)cm ln
·
1+
(h¡lm)h
h
cm¡ lmh
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)
i
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (h¡lm)
¸
¸ 0: (46)
Therefore, the same results hold when ka
km
= 1 as well.
[Relations of a¤ satisfying the equation with ka
km
]: Since (19) can be expressed as
¡Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
1¡ ka
km
ln
µ
a¤
ka
km
+1¡a¤
¶
(47)
=
1
h¡lm ln
"
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
+(h¡lm)cm
lm
Ah(a¤)
Al(a¤)
(h¡lm kakm)
h
#
+
1
lm
cm
1¡ ka
km
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
ln
"
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤
h¡lm kakm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
+(h¡lm)cm
cm
#
;
the derivative of the LHS¡RHS of (19) with respect to ka
km
when ka
km
6=1 equals
¡ Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
1¡ ka
km
·
ln(a¤ kakm+1¡a
¤)
1¡ ka
km
+ a
¤
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤
¸
¡ 1
lm
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)2
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
ln
·
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤
h¡lm kakm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
cm
¸
+ lm
h¡lm
·
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
¡ 1
h¡lm kakm
¸
¡ 1
lm
cm
1¡ ka
km
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
·
a¤
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤+
lm
h¡lm kakm
¡ lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
¸
= 1
(h¡lm)(1¡ kakm )
ln
·
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (h¡lm kakm)
h¸ ¡Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
1¡ ka
km
a¤
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤+
lm

Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) ¡cm

(h¡lm kakm )
h
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
i
¡ 1
lm
cm
1¡ ka
km
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
·
a¤
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤¡
lm(h¡lm)

Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) ¡cm

(h¡lm kakm )
h
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
i¸
= km
km¡ka
8<:¡hNhNl + Al(a¤)Ah(a¤)ikmlm a¤Ak(a¤)cm+ km

1¡cm Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)

hkm¡lmka +
1
h¡lm ln
·
(km¡ka)lmAh(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)kmcm
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
h¸
9=; : (48)
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Since the derivative on (HL) is examined, by substituting (19) into the above equation
km
km¡ka
8>><>>:
¡
h
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
i
km
lm
a¤
Ak(a¤)
cm+
km

1¡cm Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)

hkm¡lmka +
Nh
Nl
km
lm
cm
km¡ka ln
³
km
Ak(a¤)´
¡km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm
km¡ka ln
·
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)+(h¡lm)cm
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a
¤)
¸
9>>=>>;
= kmcm
(km¡ka)2
km
lm
8><>:
Nh
Nl
h
ln
³
km
Ak(a¤)´
+1¡ km
Ak(a¤)
i
¡ Al(a¤)
Ah(a¤)
·
(km¡ka)Ah(a¤)Al(a¤) 1cm
Al(a
¤)kmcm¡lmAk(a¤)
Ak(a¤)(hkm¡lmka) +ln
·
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)+(h¡lm)cm
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a
¤)
¸¸
9>=>;: (49)
The above expression is positive at cm=
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
from (30) in the proof of Lemma 1 and
is negative at cm=
lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
from (60) in the proof of Lemma 3. Further, the derivative of
the expression inside the big bracket of the above equation with respect to cm equals
¡(km¡ka) 1c2m
lm
hkm¡lmka¡
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
·
h¡lm
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
¡ 1
cm
¸
= lm
km
km¡ka
cm
·
¡ 1
cm
km
hkm¡lmka+
1
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
¸
=¡ l2m
km
1
c2m
(km¡ka)2
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) ¡cm
i
(hkm¡lmka)
h
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
i ;
(50)
which is negative for cm2
h
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
; lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
i
from Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
¡cm¸ Ah(a¤)km¡lmAk(a¤)Al(a¤)km =
(hkm¡lmka)a¤
Al(a¤)km
>
0 ( lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
> lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, ka
km
< h
lm
): Hence, there exists a unique cm 2 ( lmkm kah
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
; lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
)
such that (48) is positive (negative) for smaller (greater) cm.
When ka
km
! 1, (48) equals
lim
ka
km
!1
1
1¡ ka
km
(
¡
h
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
i
1
lm
a¤
a¤ ka
km
+1¡a¤ cm+
1¡cm Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
h¡lm kakm
+ 1
h¡lm ln
·
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (h¡lm kakm )
h¸
)
= ¡ lim
ka
km
!1
8<:hNhNl + Al(a¤)Ah(a¤)i 1lm a¤2cm(a¤ kakm+1¡a¤)2+ lm

1¡cm Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)

(h¡lm kakm)2
+ 1
h¡lm
·
¡lmAh(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
+ lm
h¡lm kakm
9¸=;
= ¡
8<:hNhNl + Al(a¤)Ah(a¤)ia¤2cmlm ¡ lm

1¡cm Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)

1
cm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) ¡1

(h¡lm)2
9=; : (51)
The above expression is positive at cm=
lm
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
from (33) in the proof of Lemma 1 and is
negative at cm =
lm
Al(a¤)
from (63) in the proof of Lemma 3. Further, the derivative of the
expression with respect to cm is negative. Hence, the same result holds when
ka
km
= 1 as well.
Proof of Lemma 3. [Derivation of the equation]: The LHS of (HL) when c¤ = 1 ,
cl(a
¤)¸1 and ka
km
6=1 equals Nh
Nl
times
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Z c¡1l (1)
0
Z cl(a)
0
dcda
Al(a)
+
Z a¤
c¡1l (1)
Z 1
0
dcda
Al(a)
=
Z c¡1l (1)
0
cl(a)
Al(a)
da+
Z a¤
c¡1l (1)
da
Al(a)
=
km
lm
cm
Z c¡1l (1)
0
da
Ak(a)
+
Z a¤
c¡1l (1)
da
Al(a)
=
km
lm
cm
km¡ka ln
µ
km
Ak(c
¡1
l (1))
¶
+
1
lm¡la ln
µ
Al(c
¡1
l (1))
Al(a¤)
¶
;
(52)
where the value of c¡1l (1); i.e. a when cl(a) = 1, equals, from (2) and (3),
Al(a)
Ak(a)
=
lm
km
1
cm
, ¡a(lm¡la) + lm = lm
km
1
cm
[¡a(km¡ka)+km]
, a = lm(1¡cm)
(km¡ka) lmkm ¡ (lm¡la)cm
: (53)
Hence, from (52) and
Ak(c
¡1
l (1))=
¡lm(1¡cm)(km¡ka)+km
h
(km¡ka) lmkm¡(lm¡la)cm
i
(km¡ka) lmkm ¡ (lm¡la)cm
=
(lakm¡lmka)cm
(km¡ka) lmkm ¡ (lm¡la)cm
; (54)
Al(c
¡1
l (1))=
¡lm(1¡cm)(lm¡la)+lm
h
(km¡ka) lmkm¡(lm¡la)cm
i
(km¡ka) lmkm ¡ (lm¡la)cm
=
lm
km
(lakm¡lmka)
(km¡ka) lmkm ¡ (lm¡la)cm
; (55)
the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
6=1 equals
Nh
Nl
½
1
lm¡la ln
·
lakm¡lmka
(km¡ka)lm¡(lm¡la)kmcm
lm
Al(a¤)
¸
+
kmcm
(km¡ka)lm ln
·
(km¡ka)lm¡(lm¡la)kmcm
(lakm¡lmka)cm
¾¸
:
(56)
Applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
=1 equals
Nh
Nl
(
1
lm¡la limkakm!1
ln
"
la¡lm kakm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
lm
Al(a¤)
#
+
cm
lim ka
km
!1(1¡ kakm)lm
lim
ka
km
!1
ln
"
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
(la¡lm kakm)cm
#)
=
Nh
Nl
(
1
lm¡la ln
·
lm
cmAl(a¤)
¸
+cm lim
ka
km
!1
Ã
1
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
¡ 1
la¡lm kakm
!)
=
Nh
Nl
1
la¡lm
½
ln
·
cmAl(a
¤)
lm
¸
+1¡cm
¾
: (57)
[a¤ 2 (0; 1) for any cm]: a¤ < 1 is obvious from the equation. Since cm¸ lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
, a¤=0
is possible only at cm = 1. However, at cm = 1, the equation becomes
Nh
Nl
1
lm¡la ln
³
lm
Al(a¤)´
=
1
h¡lm ln
³
h
Ah(a¤)´
and thus a¤>0.
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[Relations of a¤ satisfying the equation with Nh
Nl
; cm; and
ka
km
]: Since the derivative
of the LHS¡RHS of (21) and (22) with respect to a¤ equals Nh
Nl
1
Al(a¤)
+ 1
Ah(a¤)
> 0; a¤ satisfying
the equation decreases with Nh
Nl
.
When ka
km
6=1, a¤ satisfying (21) decreases with cm, because the derivative of the expres-
sion inside the large curly bracket of (21) with respect to cm equalsµ
1¡ (lm¡la)kmcm
(km¡ka)lm
¶
km
(km¡ka)lm¡(lm¡la)kmcm¡
km
(km¡ka)lm+
km
(km¡ka)lm ln
·
(km¡ka)lm¡(lm¡la)kmcm
(lakm¡lmka)cm
¸
=
1
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
ln
"
1+
1¡cm
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
la¡lm kakm
#
> 0: (58)
limcm!1
@a¤
@cm
=0 is clear from the above equation.
Since (21) can be expressed as
Nh
Nl
(
1
lm¡la ln
"
la¡lm kakm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
lm
Al(a¤)
#
+
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
ln
"
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
(la¡lm kakm)cm
#)
=
1
h¡lm ln
µ
h
Ah(a¤)
¶
; (59)
when ka
km
6= 1, the derivative of the expression inside the large curly bracket of (21) with
respect to ka
km
equals
lm
lm¡la¡ cm1¡ ka
km
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
¡
lm
lm¡la¡ cm1¡ ka
km
la¡lm kakm
+
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)2lm
ln
"
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
(la¡lm kakm)cm
#
= ¡
Ã
lm
lm¡la¡
cm
1¡ ka
km
!
(lm¡la)(1¡cm)
[(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm](la¡lm kakm)
+
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)2lm
ln
"
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
(la¡lm kakm)cm
#
= ¡ cm
(1¡ ka
km
)2lm
Ã
1¡cm
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
la¡lm kakm
¡ ln
"
1+
1¡cm
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
la¡lm kakm
#!
< 0: (60)
The derivative is negative because the expression inside the large parenthesis of (60) equals
0 at cm = 1 and, when
ka
km
< (>)1, it increases (decreases) with 1¡cm
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
la¡lm kakm
and thus
decreases with cm. Hence, a
¤ satisfying (21) increases with ka
km
when ka
km
6=1. limcm!1 @a¤@ ka
km
=0
is clear from the above equation.
The corresponding derivatives when ka
km
! 1 are
cm : lim
ka
km
!1
(
1
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
ln
"
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
(la¡lm kakm)cm
#)
=
¡1
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
"
¡lm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
+
lm
la¡lm kakm
#
=
1
la¡lm
1¡cm
cm
> 0: (61)
ka
km
: lim
ka
km
!1
(
¡ cm
(1¡ ka
km
)2lm
Ã
1¡cm
cm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm
la¡lm kakm
¡ln
"
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
(la¡lm kakm)cm
#!)
= lim
ka
km
!1
(
cm
2(1¡ ka
km
)lm
Ã
1¡cm
cm
¡(la¡lm kakm)lm+(1¡ kakm)l2m
(la¡lm kakm )2
¡
"
¡lm
(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm
+
lm
la¡lm kakm
#!)
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=
cm
2lm
Ã
1¡cm
cm
lim
ka
km
!1
2l2m(la¡lm)
(la¡lm kakm)3
+ lim
ka
km
!1
"
¡l2m
[(1¡ ka
km
)lm¡(lm¡la)cm]2
+
l2m
(la¡lm kakm)2
#!
(62)
=
cm
2lm
l2m
(la¡lm)2
·
2
1¡cm
cm
+
µ
1¡ 1
c2m
¶¸
= ¡1
2
lm
(la¡lm)2
(1¡cm)2
cm
< 0; (63)
where la¡lm > 0 from lmkm
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
< 1, 1 < la
lm
. Therefore, the same results hold when ka
km
=1
as well.
Proof of Lemma 4. [Relations of cm satisfying (P) with a
¤; km; ka; and r]: Derivatives
of the LHS of (P) with respect to a¤, cm; km; and ka equal
a¤ :
@Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
@a¤
lm
km
r
cm
Z 1
a¤
Z minfch(a);1g
0
dcda
Ah(a)
> 0; (64)
cm : ¡ lm
km
r
c2m
(Z a¤
0
Z minfcl(a);1g
0
dcda
Al(a)
+
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
Z 1
a¤
Z minfch(a);1g
0
dcda
Ah(a)
)
<0; (65)
km : ¡ 1
km
½
1¡r
·Z a¤
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
dcda
cAk(a)
+
Z 1
a¤
Z 1
minfch(a);1g
dadc
cAk(a)
¾¸
¡r
·Z a¤
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
(1¡a)dcda
c(Ak(a))2
+
Z a¤
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
(1¡a)dcda
c(Ak(a))2
¸
< 0; (66)
ka : ¡ r
·Z a¤
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
adcda
c(Ak(a))2
+
Z a¤
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
adcda
c(Ak(a))2
¸
< 0; (67)
where cl(a
¤) = ch(a¤) = c¤; 1cl(a)Ak(a) =
lm
km
1
cm
1
Al(a)
; and 1
ch(a)Ak(a)
= lm
km
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
1
cm
1
Ah(a)
are used
to derive the equations. The results are straightforward from the equations.
[(P) does not hold at cm = 0]: Noting that cl(a) =
km
lm
Al(a)
Ak(a)
cm and ch(a) =
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
Ah(a)
Ak(a)
cm;
when cm!0, the LHS of (P) becomes
r
Z a¤
0
da
Ak(a)
+r
Z 1
a¤
da
Ak(a)
+r
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
dadc
cAk(a)
= r
Z 1
0
da
Ak(a)
¡ r
km¡ka ln(
km
ka
)lim
c!0
ln c = +1 > 1: (68)
Hence, (P) does not hold at cm=0:
Proof of Proposition 1. At cm=1, cl(a); ch(a) >1 from (13), thus (P) equals
lm
km
r
Z a¤
0
da
Al(a)
+
lm
km
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
r
Z 1
a¤
da
Ah(a)
= 1: (69)
When km is very small, the LHS of the above equation is strictly greater than 1 for any
a¤ 2 [0; 1] (thus, (P) does not hold for any cm and a¤ from Lemma 4), or a¤ satisfying the
equation is weakly smaller than a¤ 2 (0; 1) satisfying (HL) at cm=1 (a¤ 2 (0; 1) holds on
(HL) from Lemma 3). In such case, there is no a¤ 2 (0; 1) and cm<1 satisfying both (HL)
and (P), and thus machines are not employed, i.e. cm=1, in equilibrium, where equilibrium
a¤ is determined from (HL) with cm=1.
When km becomes large enough that a
¤ satisfying (69) is greater than a¤ 2 (0; 1) satis-
fying (HL) at cm=1, an equilibrium with cm< 1 exists from shapes of (HL) and (P). The
34
dynamics of cm and a
¤ are straightforward from shapes of the two loci. The dynamics of
c¤ and ca are from c¤=min
n
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ak(a¤)
cm;1
o
, ca=min
n
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm;1
o
, and the assumptions
that ka
km
is time-invariant and satisﬁes ka
km
< la
lm
. The dynamics of cl(a) and ch(a) are from
those of the other variables.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) When cm ¸ lmkm kah
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
; earnings of skilled workers increase
over time from Propositions 4 (iii) and 5 (iii) below. Earnings of both types of workers
increase when cm <
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
from Proposition 6 (iii) below. (ii) is straightforward from
Proposition 1 and the earnings equations (eqs. 15 and 16).
(iii) Y decreases with the LHS and the RHS of (HL) from (10). When c¤ = ca = 1 and
ka
km
6= 1, the RHS of (HL) equals 1
h¡lm ln
³
h
Ah(a¤)´
from Lemma 3, which decreases with the
growth of km and ka with constant
ka
km
from Proposition 1. When c¤ < ca < 1 and kakm 6= 1,
the RHS of (HL) equals km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
cm
km¡ka ln
³
Ak(a
¤)
ka
´
from (27) in the proof of Lemma 1, which
decreases with the productivity growth from Proposition 1. When c¤ < ca = 1 and kakm 6= 1,
the derivative of the RHS of (HL) with respect to cm equals, from (43) in the proof of Lemma
2 and (19),
¡ 1
(h¡lm)cm ln
·
1+
(h¡lm)hkm
h
cm¡ lmh kakm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤)
i
lm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) (hkm¡lmka)
¸
+
Nh
Nl
km
lm
1
km ¡ ka ln
µ
km
Ak(a¤)
¶
=
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
1
km¡ka ln
·
(km¡ka) lmkm
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) +(h¡lm)cm
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a
¤)
¸
> 0; (70)
and the derivative with respect to a¤ equals, from (40) in the proof of Lemma 2 ,
¡km
lm
cm
km¡ka
(
Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
km¡ka
Ak(a¤)
¡
@ Al(a
¤)
Ah(a¤)
@a¤
ln
·
1+
(km¡ka)Ah(a
¤)
Ak(a
¤)
h
lm
km
Ak(a
¤)
Al(a
¤) ¡cm
i
(hkm¡lmka)cm
Ak(a
¤)
)¸
< 0: (71)
From signs of the derivatives and Proposition 1, the RHS of (HL) decreases with the pro-
ductivity growth. Hence, Y increases over time when ka
km
6= 1. The result when ka
km
= 1 can
be proved similarly.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since an increase in Nh
Nl
shifts (HL) to the left on the (a¤; cm)
space from Lemmas 1¡3, the result that cm and a¤ decrease is straightforward from Figures
7¡9. Then, wl = lmkm rcm rises and whwl =
Ah(a
¤)
Al(a¤)
falls. Since c¤ ´ min
n
km
lm
Al(a
¤)
Ak(a¤)
cm;1
o
; c¤ falls
when c¤<1 from ka
km
< la
lm
, da
¤
d
Nh
Nl
< 0; and dcm
d
Nh
Nl
< 0. cl(a) decreases from
dcm
d
Nh
Nl
< 0: Proofs of
the results for ch(a); ca, wh; and Y are in the proof of Proposition 7.
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